Social Engagement in Online Learning

Dr. Clinton Bradford, SYLVA



SYLVA

Learning made for you.





Interaction, competition, and collaboration are valuable educational tools, underutilized in online education

Sylva specializes in advanced dynamic, interactive content powered by a variety of technologies - particularly Wolfram Language

We will go over an example of how we can run, with SYLVA, an advanced Game Theory educational series, with interaction and an automated tournament, and analyze the results in WL.





How it Works

Not play with searcher persons floth of you should secretly to Cooperate or Server.

The matrix shows the seminar for each possible outcome. Not sentence is displayed in starge, your copuration contained is write. 1 0





Dynamic Game/Competition Editor

DRA

Pitch

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We are now going to write a program in WL which solves the example Prisoner's Dilemma from the game.

Each round is represented by a List of two strings, yours and your opponents, saying "Betray" or "Cooperate".

Your function will be provided an Array of these rounds, in order, representing the previous rounds.

For example, the string:

1 {{"Betray", "Cooperate"}, {"Cooperate", "Cooperate"}, {"Betray", "Betray"}}

Represents a three-round game in which your opponent chose "Cooperate", "Cooperate", "Betray".

For example, the strategy of "Always Betray" is given by the function:

1 Function[rounds, "Betray"]

Write a Prisoner's Dilemma Solver

Please write a function wl from the game.



Your code will play 20 rounds of the Prisoner's Dilemma versus the other participants, in a round robin tournament.

The top 3 scorers will receive extra credit.

Your answer: 1

Code Answers

Please write a function which plays the prisoner's dilemma, with the same values

Immediate, Intelligent Feedback

```
1 (*
   The "Friendly Copycat" Strategy
2
   - Starts with Cooperate
3
   - Does whatever the Opponent did last
4
5 *)
6 Function
   rounds,
   Last@Last[rounds,{"Cooperate"}]
8
9]
```

Correct ~

Your Submission:

- Doesn't throw an error
- Returns the correct values
- Handles the empty-list first case

Player	1	2	3	4	5	Score
You	Cooperate	Betray	Betray	Cooperate	Cooperate	11
Opponent	Betray	Betray	Cooperate	Cooperate	Cooperate	11

- In a 5-round match up vs a steadfast traitor:

Player	1	2	3	4	5	Score
You	Cooperate	Betray	Betray	Betray	Betray	21
Opponent	Betray	Betray	Betray	Betray	Betray	16

Player	1	2	3	4	5	Score
You	Cooperate	Cooperate	Cooperate	Cooperate	Cooperate	5
Opponent	Cooperate	Cooperate	Cooperate	Cooperate	Cooperate	5

+6/6

- In a 5-round match up vs a fixed, random strategy:

- In a 5-round match up vs a steadfast cooperator:



Analyzed in Aggregate



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Download

Picard	Vs. Janeway	Vs. Sisco
0	76	48
20	20	52
20	20	51
10	38	42





- SYLVA
- Advanced assessment LMS
- Wolfram Powered
- https://www.sylva.ac
- clinton@sylva.ac



• Dr. Clinton Bradford • PHD @ Purdue, 2021 • Analytic Number Theory / **Quadratic Form Algorithms** • STEM Outreach Enthusiast https://www.clintonbradford.com

Directed Acyclic Graphs for interactives





Polls

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Item Response Theory

